a cryptographic key if and only if they happen to have keys in common. Several extensions of this simple scheme have been investigated, which we will review in the next section.
The primal objective of this study is to construct a better implementation of the key predistribution scheme than the random key distribution scheme of [6] . We consider three quantitative measures to evaluate key predistribution schemes; the node memory size, the connectivity and the key-survivability. The node memory size (or memory size for simplicity) is the number of keys that a node needs to remember, the connectivity is the probability that randomly chosen two sensor nodes have one or more keys in common, and the key-survivability is the probability that the key which has been agreed by two nodes stays secure even if an intruder mounts the node capture attack, in which an intruder captures sensor nodes deployed in a field, and retrieves keys embedded in the nodes. There are obvious tradeoff relations between the three quantitative measures. For example, if we try to increase the connectivity without changing the memory size, then the key-survivability decreases accordingly in general. A key predistribution scheme needs to provide good tradeoff points with respect to the three measures, and it is preferred that the tradeoff points are controllable. The random key distribution scheme is, however, not good with respect to these issues, because the scheme is so simple that we have little way to control its performance.
In this study, we consider to actively control keys to be embedded in sensor nodes so that both the connectivity and the key-survivability are larger than the random key distribution scheme. For this sake, we consider to use simple geometric properties of lines and points. We associate each node with a line over a two-dimensional finite plane, and manage keys so that two nodes can agree a key if and only if the associated lines intersect with each other. Two randomly chosen lines intersect with each other unless they are parallel, thus two nodes succeed in key agreement with high probability. We propose a scheme that is directly based on this idea, and call the scheme a basic scheme in this manuscript. The basic scheme can realize high connectivity with small memory size, but it is difficult to flexibly control the tradeoff points in general. To overcome this problem, we investigate two extensions of the basic scheme. The extended schemes have more flexibility than the basic scheme, though they are not as advantageous as the basic scheme compared to the random key distribution scheme. We evaluate the basic and extended schemes analytically, Let L be the class of all lines, then L contains p2 lines in total. Let L be a line in L, then there are p lines (including l itself) that are parallel to l, and all the other p2-p=p(p-1) lines intersect with l. Thus if we choose another line from L randomly, then the line intersect with l with probability
which approaches to 1 as p in- The key-survivability of the basic scheme for pcon=0.99 and m=101. Fig. 3 The memory size of the basic scheme for Pcon=0.99.
have four times more keys than the basic scheme. Other comparisons for other choice of psurc and c are presented in Fig. 3 . We can see that the basic scheme requires smaller number of keys than the random key scheme. The number of keys has strong relationship to the memory size of a sensor node, and thus to the manufacturing cost and the energy efficiency of a node. We could see clear advantage of the basic scheme against the random key distribution scheme. We would like to remark that the basic scheme also has an advantage in the communication overhead for the key agreement. In the random key distribution scheme, two nodes need to exchange what keys they do have. This will be done by exchanging the indices of the keys, but the communication cost for this operation should be proportional to the number of keys in the nodes. In the basic scheme, the keys are assigned in a structured and systematic manner, which helps reducing the communication overhead. Remind that a line over a plane is defined by just two parameters, a and b. Once two node, n and n', exchange their parameters, then the nodes can compute the intersection point of l(n) and l(n') by themselves. Fig. 4 The performance of the extended scheme 2 for three choices of parameters with pcon=0.5. The key-survivability of the extended schemes with pcon=0 .33.
Fig. 6
The key-survivability of the extended schemes with pcon=0.5. Fig. 7 The key-survivability of the extended schemes with pcon=0.9. to 1. This result suggests that the proposed scheme is more favorable when we need high connectivity.
Numerical results show that the extended scheme 1 has small advantage to the extended scheme 2 with respect to the key-survivability. We note, however, that the extended scheme 2 have some advantages which are not illustrated in the figures. For example, the extended scheme 2 allows sensor nodes to have two or more keys in common. Hence techniques similar to the q-composite key [3] is easily available in the extended scheme 2, and the key-survivability might be improved by using such additional techniques.
5. Discussion
Choice of Parameters
To use the proposed scheme in real applications, we need to determine the values of parameters. Different choice of parameters gives the scheme different characteristics. We would like to find the optimum values of parameters for a given application, but the choice of parameters strongly depends on many aspects that are difficult to quantify. For example, we consider how the density of sensor nodes affects the choice of parameters. If sensor nodes are deployed sparsely in a field, then we should choose parameters so that the scheme has high connectivity. In a sparse network, a node is expected to have small number of neighbor nodes. If the connectivity is small in this sparse network, then it can happen with considerable probability that a node cannot agree a key with any of its neighbor nodes, and is isolated (in the sense of secure communication) in the network. Such an isolation of a node happens with probability (1-pcon)d, where d is the average number of neighbor nodes. To make this probability small, we need to let pcon take a value close to 1. This is possible by choosing a large prime number for p in the basic scheme, or by choosing p and m close in the extended scheme 1(parameter choices of the extended scheme 2 is complicated, but we can determine appropriate parameter values by solving an equation).
The discussion goes differently if sensor nodes are deployed densely. On discussing key agreement, there are two points that we need to remark to compare a sparse network and a dense network. The first point is that, in a dense network, an intruder will be able to find and capture sensor nodes easily, and the node capture attack is more serious than the sparse network case. The second point is that the cost to reinforce a key agreement scheme, for example by using path-keys [5], [9] or the multipath key reinforcement [3] , is smaller and more acceptable in a dense network than in a sparse network. Hence, instead of increasing the connectivity, we may choose parameters so that the scheme has large key-survivability, and to use the reinforce techniques to mitigate the low connectivity.
Relation to the Location-Based Approach
A sensor network is constructed by deploying a number of sensor nodes in a designated area. In many cases, it is difficult to predict (or control) the exact deploy location of each node, and we cannot know in advance which nodes come close to a given node. location-based approach is not available in this case since the move of nodes is not predictable. Within the locationfree framework, the proposed scheme show clear advantage to the random key distribution scheme when the connectivity is required to be large. It seems that the proposed scheme is the best choice for such an application.
Conclusions and Future Work
We proposed new schemes for predistributing cryptographic keys in sensor networks. The proposed scheme is a direct scheme with which key agreement is accomplished between two involved nodes only. The scheme is well suited for realizing high connectivity, which is strongly desired in sensor networks in which sensor nodes are deployed very sparsely. It is also notable that the proposed schemes do not require special assumptions nor equipments such as a timer and key diminish mechanisms. The proposed scheme can replace for the naive random key scheme, achieving higher security (with respect to the key-survivability) while other system parameters unchanged. The random key distribution scheme has been used as a fundamental component for constructing more sophisticated key management scheme, and therefore the proposed scheme can make significant contribution in the wide ranges of key management techniques for sensor networks.
The authors consider that there are a lot of points for improving and extending the basic scheme. For example, we considered lines and points over a two-dimensional plane. We can extend the geometry to three or more dimensional space.
